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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH DAKOTA CONTRACT
LAW
ALEXANDRA P. EVERHART SICKLER*
ABSTRACT

This Article surveys cases involving the application and interpretation
of North Dakota contract law from 2013 through 2016. The majority of the
cases discussed in this Article involve decisions from the North Dakota
Supreme Court, though the Article also includes a handful of relevant
decisions from the United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. This
Article does not address every ruling from the survey period; rather, it
includes only those cases that may be of interest to North Dakota attorneys,
with a focus on general and specific issues concerning contract
interpretation.

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. Many thanks to secondyear law student Michael Baldwin and Jonathan L. Sickler, Esq. for their contributions and
thoughtful comments.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys cases involving the application and interpretation
of North Dakota contract law from 2013 through 2016 and attempts to
provide some concrete guidance to North Dakota attorneys who engage
with contract law either in a transactional or litigation posture. Much of the
decisional law from the survey period reinforces longstanding contract law,
but there are more than a few cases where the courts tread upon new
ground.
For example, decisions from the North Dakota Supreme Court on
issues of contract formation, promissory estoppel doctrine, and the
application of the parol evidence rule largely embrace existing contract law.
In these areas, the factual context of the dispute or the court’s analysis is
more noteworthy than the legal principles themselves.
Attorneys may be more interested in recent decisions that announce
new rules and affect future transactional behavior. For example, the North
Dakota Supreme Court interpreted a force majeure clause for the first time,
setting forth a standard of interpretation for future disputes. In another
watershed decision, the Supreme Court declined to enforce a no-waiver
clause in a contract based on the conduct of the parties. While the North
Dakota Supreme Court has held previously that parties can waive
contractual provisions by conduct, it had not yet concluded that parties had
waived a no-waiver clause.
Decisional law from the survey period also reveals that interpretation
prevails as the most commonly heard and litigated issue. Those rulings
encompassed general matters, such as applicability of the parol evidence
rule and basic principles of contract interpretation. The courts also
announced specific rules about interpreting certain types of contractual
clauses such as “no damage for delay” clauses, indemnification clauses,
Pugh clauses, and rights of first refusal. Many of these specific ruling
affect oil and gas leases and construction contracts.
The remainder of this Article discusses the cases examined from the
survey period. The cases are divided into categories by issues. The first
category of cases discusses issues relating to the formation of a contract.
Second, this Article will address the continued viability of promissory
estoppel as an independent basis for relief and foreshadow the possibility of
a decision concerning third party promissory estoppel claims in the near
future. Third, this Article will discuss general and specific interpretation
issues outlined above. The final category of cases examines contract
defenses.
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II. FORMATION
It is not uncommon for parties to litigate formation issues even though
the basic legal principles are well-settled. The context in which such issues
arise is equally common: transactions that involve parties unrepresented by
counsel on both sides or adhesion contracts.
A. PRICE AS AN ESSENTIAL TERM
Two cases highlight the requirement that the contract price, i.e. the
consideration, must be expressly stated without being open-ended.
Lumley v. Kapusta reinforces the longstanding tenet of contract law
requiring that the essential terms of a contract be sufficiently definite for a
contract to be enforceable.1 In this case, the plaintiffs were tenant farmers
of the defendant’s North Dakota property.2 The defendant lived in Virginia
and wanted to sell her property, so in 2012, the parties had telephone
conversations about a potential transaction.3 One of the plaintiffs told the
defendant she would get an appraisal for the value of the property.4 Instead
of an appraisal, she obtained an evaluation from a bank which expressly
stated that it was not an appraisal and valued the property at $525,827.5 The
plaintiffs sent the defendant a cashier’s check based on the bank’s
evaluation, deeds to be executed by the defendant, and a note.6 The
defendant endorsed and deposited the check in a bank and signed the deeds,
but she did not return the executed deeds to the plaintiffs.7 Instead, she
telephoned the plaintiffs and asked why there had been no appraisal of the
property.8 Shortly afterward, the defendant returned the money to the
plaintiffs.9 The plaintiffs sued for specific performance of their alleged oral
contract.10
Under longstanding North Dakota law, a contract can be enforced only
when the parties have agreed on its essential terms, and price is an essential
term.11 Further, the contract must fix price with certainty or provide a

1. Lumley v. Kapusta, 2016 ND 74, ¶ 7, 878 N.W.2d 65, 67.
2. Id. ¶ 2, 878 N.W.2d at 66.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 3.
7. Kapusta, ¶ 3.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. ¶ 7, 878 N.W.2d at 67.
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method by which it can be fixed with certainty.12 Here, there was no
evidence that the parties actually agreed on a purchase price for the
property.13 No actual appraisal was performed.14 One of the plaintiffs
testified at trial that she came up with the purchase price the day she wrote
the check.15 Without an agreement as to the price to be paid for the
property, there was no enforceable contract.16
Contrast this holding with Limberg v. Sanford Medical Center Fargo,
where the plaintiff, an emergency room patient, challenged an alleged open
price term in the contract that all patients sign before receiving treatment,
but lost because the contract unambiguously provided a method by which
price can be fixed with sufficient certainty.17
In Limberg, the plaintiff challenged a hospital’s contract as ambiguous,
unfair, unconscionable, and unreasonable because the contract contained an
open price term.18 The contract at issue required all patients to pay “all
charges related to services provided by” the hospital and to adhere to the
provider’s payment guidelines.19 These payment guidelines were made
available to all patients.20 The contract did not list the exact price of the
services; nonetheless, specific contract language controlled the price terms
by referring to the payment guidelines.21 The payment guidelines, in turn,
enumerated the full, undiscounted prices of the hospital’s services, which
were higher than the prices paid by insured patients or those covered by
Medicare or Medicaid.22 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that even
though the price of each hospital service was not listed in the contract itself,
the contract reference to the “rates” or the “charges” of a hospital was a
sufficiently definite price term.23 The Supreme Court’s ruling followed the

12. Id. (citations omitted) (“[t]o be specifically enforceable, ‘[a] contract must fix the price
or consideration clearly, definitely, certainly, and unambiguously, or provide a way by which it
can be fixed with certainty.”).
13. Kapusta, ¶ 8, 878 N.W.2d at 67.
14. Id. ¶ 2, 878 N.W.2d at 66.
15. Id. ¶ 8, 878 N.W.2d at 67.
16. Id. ¶ 9, 878 N.W.2d at 68.
17. Limberg v. Sanford Med. Ctr. Fargo, 2016 ND 140, 881 N.W.2d 658.
18. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 881 N.W.2d 658, 659-60.
19. Id. ¶ 10, 881 N.W.2d at 661.
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 12.
22. Id. ¶ 9.
23. Limberg, ¶¶ 11-13, 881 N.W.2d 658, 661-62.
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majority approach to this issue; other jurisdictions across the nation have
entertained substantially similar allegations with comparable outcomes.24
This type of formation issue, namely failure to state an essential term,
such as price, is not likely to present in an arm’s length transaction
negotiated between parties of relatively equal sophistication who are
represented by counsel. These cases are noteworthy because of the context
in which the issue arose. In the first instance, the parties bargained and
attempted to reach an agreement without advice of counsel, and in the
second, the contract is one of adhesion, wherein one party lacked
opportunity to bargain. These types of cases will likely continue to arise,
and their outcomes merit monitoring by counsel, particularly where the
client is a company that interacts with consumers in an adhesion context.
B. ENFORCEABLE MODIFICATION
There were a few rulings during the survey period which reveal that
parties, as a litigation strategy, occasionally characterize certain
performance conduct as an enforceable modification to an existing contract.
Cloaking contracting behavior in this way is rarely successful, perhaps
because in North Dakota, statutory law controls how to effectively modify a
written contract unless the parties agree otherwise.25 The statute provides a
clear starting point for a court’s analysis and affords little flexibility to
maneuver around it.
The North Dakota statute provides that a written agreement may be
altered by a writing “or by an executed oral agreement and not
otherwise.”26 It further provides that “[a]n oral agreement is executed
within the meaning of this section whenever the party performing has
incurred a detriment which that party was not obligated by the original
contract to incur.”27 Put otherwise, an oral agreement is executed when the
performing party has furnished some consideration independent from the
original agreement for the change. The statute’s execution requirement
appears to codify the common law preexisting legal duty rule for oral
modifications.28 That rule requires independent consideration to support a

24. See, e.g., DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 2008); Nygaard v.
Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 2007 SD 34, ¶ 16, 731 N.W.2d 184, 192; Shelton v. Duke
Univ. Health Sys., Inc., 633 S.E.2d 113, 115-16 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–09–06 (2015).
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (Amer. Law Inst. 1981) (“Performance
of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is
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modification to avoid the risk that assent to a change is coerced or given
gratuitously.29 Per the statute, an unexecuted oral modification of a written
contract—one that remains entirely promissory on both sides30—is
invalid.31
Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, involves a party asserting a
modification argument as an unsuccessful litigation strategy.32 There, the
Seatons entered into an oil and gas lease with Gadeco covering property in
Williams County.33 The lease had a five-year term and contained a
continuing operations clause.34 This clause enabled Gadeco to extend the
initial term of the lease if no more than ninety days elapsed between
completing or abandoning one well and beginning to drill a subsequent
one.35
Before the five-year initial term on the Gadeco lease expired, the
Seatons entered into an oil and gas top lease with Valentina Exploration,
LLC (“Valentina”).36 In March 2012, a Gadeco land manager mailed a
letter to the Seatons invoking the continuing operations clause for some
sections of the leased land, while also acknowledging that the lease, per its
express terms, would expire as to sections where no wells had been
drilled.37 In litigation, Valentina claimed that this letter constituted an
enforceable modification of the existing lease.38
As stated, in North Dakota, parties may modify a written contract by
another written contract, but for Gadeco’s letter to constitute an effective
modification, all of the elements for a valid contract must be present,
including an offer, an acceptance of the offer, and sufficient consideration.39
The letter did not satisfy the first requirement, namely that it contain an

not consideration; but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was required
by the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain.”).
29. See id., cmt. a.
30. Foster v. Furlong, 8 ND 282, 78 N.W. 986, 987 (1899).
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–09–06 (2015). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–09–05 (2015)
(providing that oral agreements may be modified “by consent of the parties in writing without
independent consideration” to support the modification).
32. Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, 2016 ND 84, ¶ 26, 878 N.W.2d 397, 404-05.
33. Id. ¶ 2, 878 N.W.2d at 399.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. ¶ 3 (quoting Sandwick v. LaCrosse, 2008 ND 77, ¶ 4, 747 N.W.2d 519, 521). A top
lease is “a lease granted by a landowner during the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is
to become effective if and when the existing lease expires or is terminated.” Id.
37. Id. ¶ 4.
38. Valentina Williston, LLC, ¶ 15, 878 N.W.2d at 402.
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (2015).
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offer to modify Gadeco’s rights under the lease.40 The letter only
incorrectly summarized the lease terms; nothing indicated an objective offer
to modify the lease’s terms in any respect, including concerning Gadeco’s
drilling rights under the continuing operations clause.41 Accordingly,
Valentina’s modification argument failed.42
This case represents a trend in the decisional law that shows parties
trying to cloak contracting behavior as a modification to the original terms
of the contract. In this case, Valentina likely had a good faith basis for
asserting that an enforceable modification required a particular result, but
that argument relied on an extremely weak premise. Similarly, in
Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Company, one party tried
unsuccessfully to enforce a purported oral modification to the payment
terms in a written agreement for the purchase of land.43 In that case, the
North Dakota Supreme Court declined to enforce the purported
modification because it was unexecuted44—neither party had “incurred a
detriment which that party was not obligated by the original contract to
incur.”45
Counsel should keep in mind that contract law emphasizes mutual
assent with regard to contract modifications.46 North Dakota, in particular,
unequivocally requires bilateral consent to contract modifications, without
regard to whether the original contract is in writing or oral.47 Its decisional
law—as witnessed in the Gadeco ruling—requires an offer and an
acceptance to effectively change a written agreement via a writing.48 Its
statute concerning modification of an oral agreement likewise emphasizes
mutual assent.49 It permits contract modifications to oral agreements either
in writing without independent consideration to support the alteration or
40. Valentina Williston, LLC, ¶ 28, 878 N.W.2d at 405.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Constellation Dev., LLC v. W. Tr. Co., 2016 ND 141, 882 N.W.2d 238. See also infra
Section III.B.
44. Id. ¶ 21, 882 N.W.2d at 246.
45. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–09–06 (2015).
46. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on
Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 203-04 (1997) (“Contract law permits parties to
modify contractual terms by mutual agreement. . . . [T]he prerogative of contractors to modify
their original contract by mutual agreement is an article of faith for contract law.”).
47. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-09-05, 9-09-06 (2015).
48. Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, 2016 ND 84, ¶ 28, 878 N.W.2d 397, 405.
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-05 (2015) provides that “[a] contract not in writing may be
altered in any respect by consent of the parties in writing without a new consideration, or by oral
consent of the parties with a new consideration, and is extinguished thereby to the extent of the
alteration.”
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orally with independent consideration.50 North Dakota statute also ensures
mutual assent for oral modifications to written agreements, by requiring
they be executed, meaning that one party at least has performed the promise
that constitutes consideration for the modification.51 That requirement of
independent consideration developed at common law to ensure one party
did not obtain contract modifications through coercion.52
From a transactional perspective, counsel and contracting parties in
North Dakota should adhere to mutuality as a touchstone for creating
enforceable contract modifications. Likewise, in litigation, counsel should
ensure they have a good faith basis for making a modification argument and
look for the existence of bilateral consent as a guiding principle.
III. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
North Dakota courts continue to embrace promissory estoppel as an
independent basis for relief.53 In North Dakota, as in other states, a party
must establish four elements to successfully invoke promissory estoppel as
a claim: “1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect will
cause the promisee to change his position; 2) a substantial change of the
promisee’s position through action, or forbearance; 3) justifiable reliance on
the promise; and 4) injustice which can only be avoided by enforcing the
promise.”54 As explained below, the tension points in these cases mostly
turn on whether a clear, definite promise has been made and whether there
has been substantial and justifiable reliance.55
The North Dakota Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the ability of a
party to invoke promissory estoppel to preclude the other party from
successfully asserting the statute of frauds as a defense to enforcement of an
oral agreement.56 It declined, however, to decide whether to permit thirdparty promissory estoppel despite having two opportunities to do so in the
last decade.57

50. Id.
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (2015).
52. See Alaska Packers Ass’n. v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
53. For an extensive discussion and analysis of promissory estoppel case decisions in North
Dakota through 1990, see Thomas C. Folsom, Reconsidering the Reliance Rules: The Restatement
of Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in North Dakota, 66 N.D. L. REV. 317 (1990).
54. Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, 2016 ND 84, ¶ 25, 878 N.W.2d 397, 404.
55. See Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, 2016 ND 84, 878 N.W.2d 397; Thimjon
Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & Tr., 2013 ND 160, 837 N.W.2d 327.
56. See infra Section III.B.
57. See infra Section III.C.
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A. REQUIREMENT OF A CLEAR, DEFINITE PROMISE
Any party asserting promissory estoppel in North Dakota must satisfy
the first requirement of a clear and definite promise before a court will
consider a party’s ability to successfully invoke the doctrine.58 In Valentina
Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, the plaintiff, in a suit to quiet title subject to
an oil and gas lease, unsuccessfully argued that promissory estoppel barred
the defendant from extending the lease’s primary term under a continuing
operations clause.59 Specifically, the plaintiff tried to argue that a written
statement by the defendant’s representative in a letter to the lessors was a
promise to terminate the lease if no wells had been drilled by a specified
date.60 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the letter from the
defendant’s land manager to the lessors did not contain a clear, definite, and
unambiguous promise to terminate its rights under the lease agreement if no
wells had been drilled.61 Rather, the letter merely contained an incorrect
summary of the lease terms, which did nothing to negate the defendant’s
drilling rights under the continuing operations clause in the lease.62 Similar
to its modification argument, Valentina’s premise for the argument that a
promise was made was relatively thin.63 This case is a cautionary tale:
counsel should avoid resting a promissory estoppel claim on a weak
assertion that a promise exists.
B. EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The North Dakota Supreme Court continues to embrace promissory
estoppel as an exception to North Dakota’s statute of frauds.64 Recent
decisions reinforce the difficulty of successfully asserting promissory
estoppel as a shield to a statute of frauds defense. The two cases
highlighted here are noteworthy for counsel: the first, Knorr v. Norberg,
demonstrates the extraordinary degree of reliance a plaintiff must show to

58. Thimjon Farms P’ship, ¶ 17, 837 N.W.2d at 335; Lohse v. Atl. Richfield Co., 389
N.W.2d 352, 357 (N.D. 1986) (“We agree with those courts which require that the promise or
agreement be clear, definite, and unambiguous as to essential terms before the doctrine of
promissory estoppel may be invoked to enforce an agreement or to award damages for the breach
thereof.”).
59. Valentina Williston, LLC, ¶¶ 24-27, 878 N.W.2d at 403-04. For case facts, see supra
Part II.B.
60. Valentina Williston, LLC, ¶¶ 4, 9, 878 N.W.2d at 399, 400.
61. Id. ¶ 26, 878 N.W.2d at 404.
62. Id.
63. See supra Section II.B.
64. North Dakota recognized promissory estoppel as an exception to the statute of frauds as
early as 1976. See Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736, 740 (N.D. 1976).
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defeat a statute of frauds defense;65 the second, Constellation Development,
LLC v. Western Trust Company, underscores the interconnection between
oral modifications and the statute of frauds.66
1.

Knorr v. Norberg

In Knorr v. Norberg, promissory estoppel took an oral lease agreement
out of the statute of frauds.67 Under North Dakota’s statute of frauds, a
lease agreement for a period longer than one year must be in writing to be
enforceable.68 Parties in North Dakota may overcome the statute of frauds
as a bar to enforcement of a contract where there is an enforceable oral
agreement between the parties.69
Here, the tenants sued their son-in-law landlord seeking to enforce a
buy-back option contained in a lease.70 Tenants, Robert and Cheri Knorr,
owned a lake home.71 They fell behind on their mortgage payments and
reached out to family members for help.72 They sold their house to their
daughter and son-in-law, Alonna and Jon Norberg, then leased it back with
an option to purchase.73 The Knorrs apparently executed the lease with the
option and sent it to the Norbergs, and Alonna testified that she signed it
and saw Jon sign it, but that written lease was never found.74 Less than a
year later, the Knorrs notified the Norbergs that they intended to exercise
the buy-back option.75 By this time, Alonna and Jon had separated, and Jon
denied that there was any repurchase option.76
The Knorrs sued to recover the home, and the district court held that
there was an oral option to repurchase the home which was enforceable
under the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds.77 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed this ruling after engaging in a

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Knorr v. Norberg, 2015 ND 284, 872 N.W.2d 323.
Constellation Dev., LLC v. W. Tr. Co., 2016 ND 141, 882 N.W.2d 238.
Knorr, ¶ 9, 872 N.W.2d at 326.
Id. ¶ 8 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–06–04(3) (2015)).
Id. ¶ 9 (quoting Cooke v. Blood Systems, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 124, 127 (N.D. 1982)).
Id. ¶ 1, 872 N.W.2d at 324.
Id. ¶ 2, 872 N.W.2d at 325.
Id.
Knorr, ¶ 2, 872 N.W.2d at 325.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
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lengthy and thorough analysis of the extraordinary degree of reliance
present in the factual record.78
Counsel should heed the type of factual record present here that
justified invoking promissory estoppel to take an oral option agreement out
of the statute of frauds. Factors critical to the Knorrs’ success are their
substantial and justifiable reliance and the injustice that would result absent
enforcement of the promise.
The district court found, and the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed,
that the Knorrs had substantially changed their position by transferring the
house to the Norbergs in reliance on the Norbergs’ promise to sell back the
home.79 Testimony indicated that the Knorrs had discussed their financial
situation with their children and their children’s spouses in reliance on a
relationship of trust.80 Robert Knorr also testified he would not have
transferred the house without a buy-back option.81
The Supreme Court also found both parties justifiably relied on that
promise because the parties’ behavior at all times was consistent with an
intent to return the house to the Knorrs.82 As with the Knorrs’ change in
position, the relevant testimony was clear that the Knorrs would not have
transferred the house to the Norbergs without the buy-back option.83
Further, Jon Norberg testified that he agreed to buy the house only to
financially help the Knorrs without any intent to buy it for business or
investment purposes.84 The Supreme Court also noted from the record that
the Norbergs had never received any keys to the home, which is consistent
with an intent not to keep it.85
Finally, the Supreme Court’s review found that evidence from the trial
record substantially supported the conclusion that enforcement of the
promise was required to prevent injustice.86 For example, Jon Norberg
never paid for the mortgage even though it was in his name.87 The Knorrs
made all necessary payments and paid all costs associated with the
property.88 Thus, to decline to enforce the Norbergs’ promise to sell the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. ¶ 20, 872 N.W.2d at 329.
Knorr, ¶ 15, 872 N.W.2d at 327-28.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id.
Id.
Knorr, ¶ 16, 872 N.W.2d 323, 328.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
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home back to the Knorrs in the face of those facts would have been an
injustice.
This case isolates two of the crucial elements of promissory estoppel—
reliance and injustice—and leverages a factual record replete with evidence
demonstrating the plaintiff’s substantial reliance on the Norberg’s oral
promise to reconvey the property to overcome a misplaced writing.
Further, the degree of reliance is, as is typical in these cases, in direct
proportion to the injustice that would result absent enforcement of the
promise. Real property—home ownership—is at stake. That, combined
with the intra-family nature of the promise and the potential bad faith of Jon
Norberg lurking in the background, made this case well-suited to the use of
promissory estoppel to take the agreement out of the statute of frauds.
2.

Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Co.

The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to enforce an unexecuted
(i.e. entirely promissory) oral agreement to modify a written agreement
involving the transfer of real property based on estoppel principles in
Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Company.89 On
September 30, 2013, Constellation agreed, in writing, to purchase about
twenty-four acres of land from Western.90 The agreement also included a
three-year option to purchase additional acreage.91 Constellation notified
Western in writing of its intent to exercise this option.92 The parties agreed
in writing on September 5, 2014, to the purchase of the additional
property.93 Constellation gave Western two checks to pay for the purchase,
but each was returned for insufficient funds.94 As a result of the bad
checks, Western notified Constellation in writing that Western was
terminating the purchase agreement.95 Constellation sued Western to
enforce the purchase agreement under theories of equitable and promissory
estoppel and alleged that the parties had orally extended the payment terms
provided in that agreement.96
Constellation effectively sought to enforce an unexecuted oral
extension of the purchase agreement by promissory estoppel as an

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Constellation Dev., LLC v. W. Tr. Co., 2016 ND 141, ¶ 21, 882 N.W.2d 238, 246.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 5, 882 N.W.2d at 240-41.
Id.
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exception to the statute of frauds.97 The purchase agreement did not specify
how the parties could change its terms, so Section 9–09–06 of the North
Dakota Century Code (“the Code”) dictated the enforceability of any
modifications.98 It provides:
A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing or by
an executed oral agreement and not otherwise. An oral agreement
is executed within the meaning of this section whenever the party
performing has incurred a detriment which that party was not
obligated by the original contract to incur.99
The purchase agreement here was in writing and complied with North
Dakota’s statute of frauds.100 And the Supreme Court has previously
allowed promissory estoppel to prevent the assertion of the statute of frauds
as a defense where there is an executed oral agreement between the parties
per the Code.101 But in this case, the Court held that a party may not invoke
promissory estoppel to take an unexecuted oral agreement (or, in this case,
an unexecuted oral modification) out of the statute of frauds.102
This case illustrates at least one limit to a party’s ability to use
promissory estoppel to escape the statute of frauds. According to the
Supreme Court, an oral modification of a written contract concerning the
lease or sale of real property must be executed to take it out of the statute of
frauds based on estoppel grounds.103 Executed means that one party must
have incurred a legal detriment not provided for in the original
agreement.104
Constellation, however, alleged an unexecuted oral
modification of the written purchase agreement concerning payment terms
and was therefore unsuccessful in taking the purported extension out of the
statute of frauds.105 Counsel should view this decision as part of a broader
context in which the Supreme Court appears reluctant to agree with counsel
who characterize certain contracting behavior as contract modifications that
must be enforced.106
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (2015) (emphasis added).
100. Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 19, 882 N.W.2d at 245; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-04(3)
(2015).
101. Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 19, 882 N.W.2d at 245.
102. Id. ¶ 21, 882 N.W.2d at 246.
103. Id. ¶ 19, 882 N.W.2d at 245. See also supra Section II.B for a discussion about
creating enforceable contract modifications in North Dakota in non-Article 2 transactions.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (2015).
105. Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 19, 882 N.W.2d at 245.
106. See supra Section II.B.
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C. THIRD PARTY PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIMS
The North Dakota Supreme Court declined two relatively recent
opportunities to address whether a third party may enforce a promise under
the promissory estoppel doctrine: Thimjon Farms Partnership v. First
International Bank & Trust107 and University Hotel Development, L.L.C. v.
Dusterhoft Oil, Inc.108
Under the theory of third party promissory estoppel, a third party to an
unfulfilled promise may sue for damages suffered as a result of reasonable
reliance on that promise.109 Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts contemplates third party promissory estoppel claims.110 It
provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.111
The majority of promissory estoppel rulings does not involve third
party claims, but there is enough decisional law from other jurisdictions to
inform North Dakota courts and counsel about the availability and limits to
these types of claims.112 A tension point among the existing decisions turns
on whether to limit recovery to those persons who would be considered
third party beneficiaries under contract law or to permit a broader range of
third party plaintiffs to obtain promissory estoppel relief.113
The
Restatement favors the broader view: it refers to third parties who are the
intended beneficiaries of a promise as well as others who may foreseeably
rely on a promise and act (or refrain from acting) accordingly.114 It reports
that courts have allowed this type of promissory estoppel claim where the
third party was a beneficiary of the promise at issue.115 And it states that, in

107. Thimjon Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & Tr., 2013 ND 160, 837 N.W.2d 327.
108. Univ. Hotel Dev., LLC v. Dusterhoft Oil, Inc., 2006 ND 121, 715 N.W.2d 153.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
110. Id.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. See Henneberry v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., No. 04 Civ. 2128(PKL), 2005 WL 991772
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2005).
113. See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties,
42 SW. L.J. 931, 966-67 (1988); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The
Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 61 (1981).
114. Id. cmt. c.
115. Id.
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rare cases, promissory estoppel might be permitted for third parties that
were not beneficiaries of the promise.116 A few courts have agreed.117
The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to entertain this issue of
first impression, namely the availability of third party promissory estoppel
as a basis for relief, in Thimjon Farms118 and in Dusterhoft.119 It was
unnecessary to resolve the issue because in both instances an essential
element of the promissory estoppel claim was missing. There was no
justifiable reliance in Thimjon Farms,120 and the allegations in Dusterhoft
failed to satisfy the requirement of a clear, definite promise.121
Nonetheless, the issue is likely to present itself again, particularly as
promissory estoppel continues to thrive as an independent basis of relief.122
Any counsel contemplating a third party promissory estoppel claim should
be prepared to address the extent to which North Dakota courts should
protect third party reliance, using decisional law from other jurisdictions as
guideposts.
IV. INTERPRETATION: GENERAL ISSUES
Contract interpretation remains the most commonly litigated matter in
contract disputes. Decisional law from the survey period encompasses
general issues of contract interpretation under North Dakota law. General
issues addressed by relevant courts concern the applicability of the parol
evidence rules and general rules of interpretation.

116. Id.
117. See, e.g., von Kaulbach v. Keoseian, 783 F.Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Silberman v.
Roethe, 218 N.W.2d 723, 731-32 (Wisc. 1974) (“We can see no reason to limit recovery to those
persons who would be considered third party beneficiaries under contract law if this is what the
proposed comment suggests. If the plaintiff can prove the essential facts he should not be
precluded from recovery as a third party reasonably relying on promises made to others.”). Cf.
C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Sterling-Salem Corp., 507 F.2d 319, 322 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974) (suggesting that
reliance protection should be accorded only to a third party having complete privity with
promisor).
118. Thimjon Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & Tr., 2013 ND 160, 837 N.W.2d 327.
119. Univ. Hotel Dev., LLC v. Dusterhoft Oil, Inc., 2006 ND 121, 715 N.W.2d 153.
120. Thimjon Farms P’ship, ¶19, 837 N.W.2d at 335-36.
121. Dusterhoft Oil, Inc., ¶16, 715 N.W.2d at 157.
122. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory
Estoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 531 (2002) (concluding, through an empirical study, that promissory estoppel continues to
be a vital aspect of contract law).
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A. ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE
The following decisions reflect confusion concerning the admissibility
of extrinsic evidence with regard to written agreements. Under North
Dakota law, the parol evidence rule is a statutory rule of law that precludes
a party from using evidence of prior oral negotiations and agreements to
vary the terms of a written agreement.123 The law permits a party to
introduce such extrinsic evidence, notwithstanding the rule, for many
reasons including without limitation to demonstrate fraud, mutual mistake,
failure of consideration, and grounds for rescission or reformation.124 Cases
from the survey period encompassed all of these exceptions to the parol
evidence rule.
1.

Golden Eye Resources, LLC v. Ganske

In Golden Eye Resources, LLC v. Ganske, the North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the lower court, which failed to acknowledge
that extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove fraud even where the evidence
contradicts the written agreement.125 In this case, an oil and gas lessee sued
to quiet title to leased mineral interests while the lessors counterclaimed for
rescission of the leases based on the lessee’s fraudulent
misrepresentations.126 The district court had entered summary judgment for
the lessee, but the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
consideration of the lessors’ allegations that they were induced to lease
based on the lessee’s misrepresentations.127
The parties extensively negotiated the leases.128 The lessors’ claimed
that during negotiations the lessee made numerous material
misrepresentations to induce them to lease their interests to the lessee rather
than to another company that had offered leases on more favorable financial
terms.129 The district court held that evidence of some of the lessee’s
alleged misrepresentations—namely those indicating that it “intended to
123. Section 9-06-07 provides that “[t]he execution of a contract in writing, whether the law
requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its
matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 906-07 (2015).
124. Parol evidence, however, may not be used to supply a missing essential term of the
agreement and take the agreement outside of the statute of frauds. See Trosen v. Trosen, 2014 ND
7, ¶14, 841 N.W.2d 687, 691.
125. Golden Eye Res., LLC v. Ganske, 2014 ND 179, ¶¶ 1, 19, 853 N.W.2d 544, 547, 552.
126. Id. ¶ 6, 853 N.W.2d at 548.
127. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 853 N.W.2d at 548-49.
128. Id. ¶ 3, 853 N.W.2d at 547.
129. Id.
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drill and operate the wells itself” and “suggesting the [lessors’] property
would be drilled first”—contradicted the leases’ express terms and were
inadmissible parol evidence.130
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed because the district court
erroneously applied the parol evidence rule.131 It explained that oral
statements are permitted to show fraudulent inducement even though the
proffered evidence contradicts the written agreement.132 The lessors sought
to introduce the extrinsic evidence to show that the lessee fraudulently
induced them to enter into the leases. The district court’s misapplication of
the rule suggests that parol evidence best practices for counsel should
encompass a checklist of circumstances in which the rule does not apply.
2. Brash v. Gulleson
The North Dakota Supreme Court recently affirmed the admissibility
of parol evidence to prove a failure of consideration as well. In Brash v.
Gulleson, Brash’s widow sued Gulleson for breach of contract, alleging that
Gulleson breached a cow/calf production lease agreement when he returned
only seven cows of what she believed to be a herd of 130.133 The deceased
Brash and Gulleson executed a written lease in 2000 pursuant to which
Brash agreed to provide 130 cows to be cared for on Gulleson’s farm; in
return, Gulleson agreed to pay Brash forty percent of the calf crop each
year.134 Gulleson asserted failure of consideration based on extrinsic
evidence that the actual number of cows in the Brash herd fell well below
the 130 cows required by the contract.135 The district court permitted the
extrinsic evidence to demonstrate failure of consideration, and the Supreme
Court affirmed.136

130. Id. ¶ 15, 853 N.W.2d at 550.
131. Ganske, ¶ 19, 853 N.W.2d at 552.
132. Id.
133. Brash v. Gulleson, 2014 ND 156, ¶¶ 1, 4, 24, 835 N.W.2d 798, 800, 805-06.
134. Id. ¶ 4, 835 N.W.2d at 800.
135. Id. ¶ 5, 835 N.W.2d at 801.
136. Id. ¶¶ 16, 25, 835 N.W.2d at 803, 806; see also Four Season’s Healthcare Ctr., Inc. v.
Linderkamp, 2013 ND 159, ¶ 13, 837 N.W.2d 147, 153 (“The rule is also well settled that the
acknowledgment of the receipt of a consideration in a deed or other written contract is not
conclusive, but it may be shown by parol that the consideration agreed upon has not been paid; or
that a consideration greater or lesser than, or different from, that expressed in the deed was in fact
agreed upon.”).
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3. Friedig v. Weed
Likewise, in Friedig v. Weed, the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the admissibility of parol evidence to prove mutual mistake and
obtain reformation of a deed.137 In this case, the parties disagreed about
whether the sale of a lakefront lot included the tract of land just below the
water’s edge.138 Circumstantial extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent was
found to support a finding that the grantor intended to convey land below
the water’s edge to the grantee.139
The Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the use of circumstantial parol
evidence to prove mutual mistake is noteworthy here.140 Initially, the Court
acknowledged a high standard for use of parol evidence to prove mutual
mistake: such evidence “must be clear, satisfactory, specific, and
convincing, and a court of equity will not grant reformation upon a mere
preponderance of evidence, but only upon certainty of error.”141 Then,
relying on decisional law from other jurisdictions, it permitted use of
circumstantial evidence of the parties’ intent to dictate its holding.142
Acknowledging that circumstantial evidence can satisfy the clear and
convincing standard for purposes of mutual mistake is new, but not
necessarily a departure from the Supreme Court’s past practice.143 It simply
appears to be adopting a rule that already exists in other jurisdictions.144
B. CONDUCT NEGATED NO-WAIVER CLAUSE
In Savre v. Santoyo, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a party
waived his rights under a contract by failing to exercise them even though
the contract contained an express no-waiver clause.145 A no-waiver clause
attempts to preserve a party’s rights and remedies under a contract if that

137. Freidig v. Weed, 2015 ND 215, ¶ 11, 868 N.W.2d 546, 559.
138. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 868 N.W.2d at 548.
139. Id. ¶ 8.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 12, 868 N.W.2d at 549.
142. Id. at 549-50 (“Some courts have said circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient
to clearly and convincingly establish grounds for reformation. Lister v. Sorge, 260 Cal.App.2d
333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 63, 66–67 (1968) (grounds for reformation must be established by clear and
convincing evidence and reformation may be based solely on circumstantial evidence); Lunceford
v. Houghtlin, 326 S.W.3d 53, 64 (Mo.Ct.App.2010) (circumstantial evidence may establish mutual
mistake provided the natural and reasonable inferences clearly and decidedly prove the
mistake).”).
143. Freidig, ¶ 12, 868 N.W.2d at 549-50.
144. Id.
145. Savre v. Santoyo, 2015 ND 170, ¶ 15, 865 N.W.2d 419, 425.
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party fails to take action in response to a breach of contract.146 Such clauses
are generally considered boilerplate and are included in many different
types of contracts.
In this case, Savre owned and operated an auto repair business, and
leased property from Santoyo to operate the business starting in June
2008.147 About two years into the lease, the parties executed a lease-topurchase option agreement with respect to the property.148 Savre could
exercise the option to purchase the property, provided he satisfied certain
terms and conditions in the agreement.149 The contract also contained a nowaiver clause that provided: “No modification of or amendment to this
Option to Purchase Agreement, nor any waiver of any rights under this
Option to Purchase Agreement, will be effective unless in writing signed by
the party to be charged.”150
Savre satisfied many, but not all, of the terms and conditions required
to exercise the option.151 For example, he was often late in his rent
payments, an event of default under the option agreement entitling Santoyo
to terminate it.152 Santoyo, however, failed to exercise this right.153 He
also failed to respond to Savre’s properly provided notice of his intent to
exercise the option and evicted Savre.154 Following eviction, Savre sued for
breach of the option agreement.155
Key to the decision here is the applicability of a no-waiver clause in the
option agreement. This clause declared any waiver of rights under the
contract ineffective unless in writing and signed by the party against whom
waiver is sought to be enforced.156 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
Santoyo, by his conduct, waived his rights under the option agreement,
including the no-waiver clause, when he failed to terminate the lease
146. See Sayre, ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 422-23 (quoting a contract provision that stated that
waiver of any contract terms had to be in writing, not oral or by conduct); Kessel v. W. Sav.
Credit Union, 463 N.W.2d 629, 631 (N.D. 1990) (explaining the effect of a no-waiver clause
where enforced); BANKS, NEW YORK CONTRACT LAW § 28:7 (2015) (“Parties may limit the
effect of a course of conduct inconsistent with the contract’s terms by employing a no-waiver
provision stating that the failure of either party to enforce any provision of the agreement shall not
be deemed a waiver of such party’s right to enforce such provision in the future.”).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. ¶¶ 4-6, 865 N.W.2d at 423.
152. Sayre, ¶ 4, 865 N.W.2d at 423.
153. Id.
154. Id. ¶ 5.
155. Id. ¶ 6.
156. Id. ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 422-23.
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agreement based on Savre’s repeated late rent payments, which were events
of default under the contract.157
Relevant to the court’s ruling was evidence showing that Santoyo
accepted late monthly payments, and that Savre attempted to exercise the
purchase option believing he had made sufficient payments under the
agreement.158 The evidence also showed that Santoyo did nothing to
exercise his remedies with respect to Savre’s repeated defaults before Savre
attempted to exercise the option.159 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
upheld the district court’s finding that Santoyo, by his conduct, had waived
strict compliance with the option agreement terms.160
Here, the Supreme Court elevated performance over express terms.
Arguably, where the clause is unambiguous, the parties are of relatively
equal sophistication, and have mutually assented to the term, a no-waiver
clause should be enforced. That said, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
previously that parties, by their conduct, may waive contractual rights.161
The distinctive feature of Savre is that the Supreme Court concluded that a
party waived a no-waiver clause.162 It found that Santoyo engaged in a
pattern of conduct that potentially altered Savre’s reasonable expectations
about the agreement’s terms, thereby justifying non-enforcement of the nowaiver clause.163
It is not unusual for courts to ignore no-waiver clauses and enforce the
contract according to how the parties have performed rather than the
dictates of standard boilerplate. Counsel should be aware that North
Dakota courts appear willing to alter the effect of written contract terms,
including no-waiver clauses, based on the parties’ conduct and should
advise parties to behave accordingly. For example, if the landlord becomes
aware of a default or accepts late payment, it should notify the tenant in

157. Id. ¶ 7, 865 N.W.2d at 423.
158. Sayre, ¶¶ 4, 18, 865 N.W.2d at 423, 425.
159. Id. ¶¶ 5, 18, 865 N.W.2d at 423, 425.
160. Id. ¶ 25, 865 N.W.2d at 427; see also id. ¶ 21, 865 N.W.2d at 426 (quoting Pfeifle v.
Tanabe, 2000 ND 219, ¶ 18, 620 N.W.2d 167, 172 (emphasis added)) (explaining that “[w]aiver
may be established either by an express agreement or by inference from acts or conduct.”); id.
(quoting Pfeifle, ¶ 18, 620 N.W.2d at 172) (explaining that “[w]aiver may be found from an
unexplained delay in enforcing contractual rights or accepting performance different than called
for by the contract” though ultimately concluding that the tenant had not waived the right to
terminate the contract); Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184, 191 (N.D. 1977).
161. See Pfeifle, ¶ 18, 620 N.W.2d at 172.
162. See Kessel v. W. Sav. Credit Union, 463 N.W.2d 629, 631 (N.D. 1990) (declining to
decide whether a no-waiver clause may be waived because the record did not contain factual
evidence which could constitute a waiver).
163. See generally Savre, 2015 ND 170, 865 N.W.2d 419.
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writing that it is not waiving the default and reserves all of its rights and
remedies under the contract. The notice should include a specific reference
to any no-waiver clause in the contract in order to bolster, if not inoculate, a
party against an argument in a later dispute that conduct led to waiver. This
strategy may have led to a different result for Santoyo.
V. INTERPRETATION: SPECIFIC ISSUES
The courts’ rulings from the survey period concerning specific types of
contracts clauses yield perhaps the most practical considerations for
counsel. The types of clauses reviewed include no damage for delay
clauses, indemnification and hold harmless clauses, force majeure clauses,
Pugh clauses, and right of first offer and first refusal clauses.
A. LIMITING NO DAMAGE FOR DELAY CLAUSES
In 2014, North Dakota joined a number of other states that limit the
negative effect of no damages for delay clauses where an owner’s active
interference is the cause of the delay.164 A no damages for delay clause
exculpates an owner for liability for damages resulting from delays in the
performance of a contractor’s work.165 A typical clause, found in both
private and public contracts, may state:
No payment or compensation shall be made for damages resulting
from hindrances or delays in the progress of the work, whether
such hindrances or delays are avoidable or unavoidable. A delay
caused either wholly or in part by the actions of someone other
than the contractor shall only entitle the contractor to an extension
of time.166
Parties include these clauses to shift the risk of delay costs from owners
(or their agents) to contractors.167 It provides an owner a contractual
defense against claims by contractors and subcontractors for delay
damages.168 The plain language of a typical clause appears to prohibit
contractors from recovering extra costs caused by a delay, even where the

164. C & C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County, 2014 ND 128, 848 N.W.2d
709.
165. No Damage for Delay: A Work of Contractual Fiction, WELLE LAW (June 20, 2014),
http://wellelaw.com/2014/06/.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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owner causes the delay.169 Some states, such as Minnesota, have prohibited
such clauses by statute, at least in public contracts, on the basis that they are
unfair and against public policy.170 Most states, however, will enforce a no
damage for delay clause unless the delay results from active interference by
the owner.171
In C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County, the prime
contractor sued the county project owner for additional costs incurred as a
result of delays in the construction of a law enforcement center.172 The
contract contained a no damages for delay clause.173 In this case, the North
Dakota Supreme Court adopted the active interference exception to the
enforceability of a no damages for delay clause.174 The active interference
exception acknowledges that a contract contains an implied duty by the
owner (or his agent) to refrain from doing anything which would
unreasonably interfere with the contractor’s ability to timely and effectively
complete the work.175 Here, the property owner’s agent (the construction
manager) caused additional delays in the project when he ordered
steelworkers to erect steel anywhere to create the illusion of progress on the
project rather than use the conventional “inside-out” method.176 Despite the
presence of a no damages for delay clause in the contract, the Supreme
Court awarded the contractor extra costs because the owner’s representative
actively interfered with the work.177
The Supreme Court adopted the active interference exception in C&C
Plumbing about two years after it affirmed the enforceability of a no
damages for delay clause in Markwed Excavating, Inc. v. City of
Mandan.178 In that case, the city and its project manager failed to obtain
timely easements for the contractor to access land needed in connection
with a storm sewer improvement contract, resulting in costly delays to the
contractor.179 This contract also contained a no damages for delay

169. Id.
170. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 15.411 (2016).
171. No Damage for Delay: A Work of Contractual Fiction, supra note 165.
172. C & C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County, 2014 ND 128, ¶¶ 2-3, 848
N.W.2d 709, 712.
173. Id. ¶ 8, 848 N.W.2d at 713-14.
174. Id. ¶ 15, 848 N.W.2d at 716.
175. Id. (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 668 F.2d 435, 438 (8th
Cir. 1982)).
176. Id. ¶ 16, 848 N.W.2d at 717.
177. Id. ¶ 13, 848 N.W.2d at 716.
178. Markwed Excavating, Inc. v. City of Mandan, 2010 ND 220, ¶ 20, 791 N.W.2d 22, 30.
179. Id. ¶ 6, 791 N.W.2d at 25.
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clause.180 In this case, the Supreme Court declined to adopt a wholesale
exception for delays not contemplated by the parties as some jurisdictions
have.181 Instead, it concluded that the plain language of the provision in
this case was broad and unambiguous such that it encompassed work delays
by “any act or neglect” of the city or any other contractors employed by the
city, regardless of foreseeability.182 To hold otherwise would render the
clause—the purpose of which is to allocate the risk of unforeseeable
delays—meaningless.183 The contractor, thus, had to absorb the costs
associated with the delay of the project.184
These two cases suggest that North Dakota courts will continue to
enforce no damages for delay clauses except where there has been active
interference by the owner. Accordingly, such clauses will remain common
in construction contracts where North Dakota law applies.
No damages for delay clauses are not drafted uniformly; they take
many forms and sometimes are not even titled as such. Counsel for
contractors and subcontractors may struggle to develop strategies to limit
these risk-shifting provisions at the drafting stage. One drafting strategy is
to articulate the types of damages (e.g., additional time, additional money)
that constitute permissible delay damages versus those that are precluded.
When drafting one, the clause should provide clearly for additional time
without penalty, but no additional money, in the event of delay. If the
clause allows extra time as the sole remedy for delay, then counsel and
contracting parties should heed case law indicating that the benefitted party
must actually grant the extra time to the delayed party.185
Contractors and their counsel may have more litigation than
transactional tools to combat these clauses. As a threshold matter, counsel
should know that the application and enforceability of these clauses is statespecific. Accordingly, a choice of law clause in an agreement will affect
the scope and enforceability of any no damages for delay clause. Some
state statutes preclude enforcement of no damages for delay clauses in

180. Id. ¶ 4, 791 N.W.2d at 24.
181. Id. ¶¶ 13, 19, 791 N.W.2d at 27, 29.
182. Id. ¶ 20.
183. Id. ¶ 23.
184. See generally Markwed Excavating, Inc., ¶ 23, 791 N.W.2d at 23.
185. See, e.g., Cent. Ceilings, Inc. v. Suffolk Constr. Co. Inc., No. SUCV200604129A, 2013
WL 8721044 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2013).
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public contracts.186 In other states, these clauses are void and invalid in all
construction contracts—public and private.187
Further, as the cases above illustrate, other factors affect the application
and enforceability of a no damages for delay clause, including the contract
language, the actions of the parties, as well as state statutes and decisional
law that address defenses to enforcement of these clauses. Defenses to
enforcement of these clauses is a matter of case law development in North
Dakota but is governed by statute in other states. Counsel may be able to
raise any number of defenses to enforcement of these clauses, including, but
not limited to, the active interference exception, fraud, and unreasonable
delay, as well as traditional contract arguments such as waiver, duress,
rescission, mistake, unconscionable terms, and ambiguity.188 Finally, other
jurisdictions may recognize a broader list of exceptions than those available
under North Dakota law. In short, attorneys should draft a no damages for
delay clause against the backdrop of what the relevant jurisdiction’s law
permits and requires.
B. INDEMNIFICATION & HOLD HARMLESS CLAUSES
Recent case law has also addressed the scope of a company’s
contractual indemnity obligations and the limitations North Dakota law
imposes on such contractual obligations.189
An indemnity clause is a contractual term that requires one party to
reimburse another for its liability and damages arising out of the contract.190
Construction companies utilize indemnity clauses to allocate the risk
associated with damage to property or persons in connection with a

186. See MINN. STAT. § 15.411 (2016); CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7203 (2016) (“A public
works contract entered into on or after January 1, 2016, that contains a clause that expressly
requires a contractor to be responsible for delay damages is not enforceable unless the delay
damages have been liquidated to a set amount and identified in the public works contract.”).
187. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.360 (2016).
188. See generally Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects:
A Proposed Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1857, 1860-70 (2005).
189. See e,g., Chapman v. Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC, 49 F.Supp.3d 649 (D.N.D.
2014); Specialized Contracting, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2012 ND 259, 825
N.W.2d 872.
190. “Indemnity is a contract by which one engages to save another from a legal
consequence of the conduct of one of the parties or of some other person.” N.D. CENT. CODE §
22–02–01 (2015). “Indemnification is a remedy which allows a party to recover reimbursement
from another for the discharge of a liability which, as between them, should have been discharged
by the other.” Specialized Contracting, Inc., ¶ 14, 825 N.W.2d at 877 (quoting Olander
Contracting Co. v. Gail Wachter Inv., 2002 ND 65, ¶ 15, 643 N.W.2d 29, 36).
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project.191 Often, the company with more bargaining power leverages that
influence to obtain agreement to a clause that shifts substantial liability to
the other party, sometimes even for that company’s own negligence.192
In North Dakota, indemnity clauses are interpreted using ordinary
principles of contract interpretation193 as well as a set of statutory rules.194
Pursuant to statute, indemnity provisions that protect parties from
responsibility for their own willful or negligent injury to some other person
or property are invalid.195 North Dakota also invalidates indemnity
provisions in construction contracts, which hold contractors liable for
erroneous acts or omissions of owners (or their agents) in both design plans
and specifications.196
In addition to the indemnity provisions typically included in
contractual agreements, “additional insured” provisions, in conjunction with
“hold harmless” language, may also be included by companies as a
supplementary layer of protection from liability.197 By adding these
provisions, the indemnitee (typically an owner or general contractor) is
protected from liability by the insurer of the indemnitor.198
In Chapman v. Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC, Chapman sued
Hiland, the owner/operator of a natural gas processing facility, for injuries
sustained in an explosion that occurred while Chapman was removing water
from tanks at the gas plant to haul away.199 Prior to the injury, Hiland had
contracted with Missouri Basin Well Service, Inc. (“Missouri Basin”) for
certain plant operation services.200 Missouri Basin, in turn, subcontracted
certain water hauling services to B&B Heavy Haul, LLC (“B&B”), in

191. See Specialized Contracting, Inc., ¶ 14, 825 N.W.2d at 877 (explaining the purpose and
effect of indemnity clauses).
192. Roger W. Stone & Jeffrey A. Stone, Indemnity in Iowa Construction Law, 54 DRAKE
L. REV. 125, 130 (2005) (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508,
523 (7th Cir. 1988)); see also Dean B. Thompson & Colin Bruns, Indemnity Wars: Anti-Indemnity
Legislation Across the Fifty States, 8 J. AM. C. CONSTRUCTION LAWS. 1 (2014),
http://www.fwhtlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Anti-Indemnity-Legislation-Across-theFifty-States.pdf.
193. Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 653.
194. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-02-07 (2015) (explaining the “[r]ules applied in
interpretation of a contract of indemnity”).
195. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-02 (2015).
196. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-02.1 (2015).
197. Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 654; see Specialized Contracting, Inc., ¶ 29, 825 N.W.2d
at 882.
198. See Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 654.
199. Id. at 651-52.
200. Id. at 651.

2016] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH DAKOTA CONTRACT LAW

45

which B&B agreed to indemnify Missouri Basin from certain liability.201
Hiland filed a third-party complaint against Missouri Basin and B&B,
Chapman’s employer, arguing that Hiland was entitled to indemnification
and defense from Missouri Basin and B&B even if the harm was a result of
Hiland’s own negligence.202 B&B moved for summary judgment on claims
asserted against it, by both Hiland and Missouri Basin.203
The issue in Hiland’s third-party complaint was whether B&B had to
indemnify Hiland for Hiland’s own negligence based on an indemnity
provision in the unsigned subcontract Missouri Basin entered into with
B&B.204 The court ultimately concluded that there was no legal basis for
such a result.205 North Dakota case law previously permitted the
indemnification of a party’s own negligence if the intent was explicitly
provided for in the contract.206 Here, there was no such intent.207
In North Dakota, when a contract contains both the hold harmless and
additional insured insurance provision language, there is little question the
parties intended that the indemnitee be indemnified against the
consequences of its own negligence. Specifically, the Supreme Court has
held that standard hold harmless provisions which agree to indemnify a
party against “any and all claims” are construed to include a “promise to
protect and defend” the indemnified party against all third-party claims.208
Pursuant to the contract between Hiland and Missouri Basin, Hiland was
named as an additional insured on the Missouri Basin liability insurance
policy.209 In other words, unmistakable intent of broad indemnification
obligations is evidenced by the inclusion of both hold harmless and
additional insured insurance provisions in a contract.
Here, the unsigned contract between Missouri Basin and B&B provides
that B&B will “save harmless” Missouri Basin and the Customer from “any
and all claims” including those that arise from Missouri Basin’s
negligence.210 As well, the subcontract required Missouri Basin to be listed

201. Id.
202. Id. at 651-52.
203. Id. at 652.
204. Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 652.
205. Id.
206. Rupp v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 465 N.W.2d 614, 616 (N.D. 1991); Bridston v. Dover
Corp., 352 N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (N.D. 1984).
207. Chapman, 49 F.Supp.3d at 655-56.
208. Bridston, 352 N.W.2d at 197.
209. Chapman, 49 F.Supp.3d at 654.
210. Id. at 655.
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as an additional insured on B&B’s liability insurance policy.211 On that
basis, the court found that the unsigned contract between Missouri Basin
and B&B expressed an intent that B&B indemnify Missouri Basin for
B&B’s negligence and Missouri Basin’s own negligence.212 There was no
mention, however, of B&B indemnifying Missouri Basin or Hiland for
Hiland’s negligence, nor was Hiland specifically granted additional insured
status under the B&B contract.213 The court concluded, there was no clear
intent concerning B&B’s obligation to Hiland because, while the “save
harmless” language was present, the additional insured insurance
requirement as applicable to Hiland was clearly absent.214 Construing the
ambiguity against Hiland, the party seeking indemnification, the court held
that B&B did not have to indemnify Hiland for Hiland’s own negligence.215
The court also ruled the indemnity clause was void and unenforceable
under statute.216 In 2009, the North Dakota legislature enacted an antiindemnification statute, which prohibits a motor carrier transportation
agreement containing any indemnity, duty to defend, or hold harmless
provision, or an agreement that “has the effect of indemnifying, defending,
or holding harmless” an indemnitee for their own negligence.217 The court
ruled that the indemnity clause in the Missouri Basin-B&B agreement was
void and unenforceable under that statute.218
In addition, Missouri Basin filed a cross-claim against B&B, claiming
that under the subcontract, Missouri Basin was entitled to indemnification
for any liability that flowed from Hiland to Missouri Basin regarding
Chapman’s injuries pursuant to the prime agreement.219 Specifically,
Missouri Basin posited that its contract with Hiland and its subcontract with
B&B should be read together as a single transaction, in effect, allowing
Missouri Basin’s indemnification obligations to Hiland to pass-through to
B&B.220 The court rejected this argument noting that the two contracts
involved different parties and were separately negotiated years apart.221 In
particular, the court found it relevant that the subcontract between Missouri
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 655-56.
Id.
Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 656.
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-02-10(2) (2015).
Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id.
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Basin and B&B made no reference to the contract between Hiland and
Missouri Basin nor any liability Missouri Basin may have assumed in the
prime contract.222 Accordingly, the court found that B&B had taken on no
contractual responsibility for Hiland’s negligence that Missouri Basin had
assumed in the prime contract.223
This case highlights how North Dakota courts strictly construe an
ambiguity in an indemnity provision against the indemnitee.224 But its
implications are much broader. Parties must carefully craft provisions that
reflect the parties’ intent regarding indemnification risk allocation.
Specifically, subcontracts should reference prime contracts, include
flowdown provisions, and incorporate indemnification obligations from the
prime contract that the parties want the subcontractor to assume. Finally,
indemnification provisions, standing alone, do not settle indemnification
liability questions. Hold harmless provisions along with certain insurance
requirements can have a determinative effect on indemnification
obligations.
C. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE
The North Dakota Supreme Court examined the enforceability of a
force majeure clause for the first time in Entzel v. Moritz Sport &
Marine.225 A “force majeure” clause is a contract provision that relieves the
parties from performing their contractual obligations when certain defined
circumstances beyond their control arise, making performance inadvisable,
commercially impracticable, illegal, or impossible.226
In this case, Entzel entered into a Boat Space Rental Agreement with
Moritz and pre-paid for use of a marina boat slip on the Missouri River in
Mandan, for the period of May 15, 2011, through October 1, 2011.227 That
agreement included a force majeure clause.228 Entzel did not use the slip at
222. Id. at 658.
223. Id.
224. Chapman, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 656.
225. Entzel v. Moritz Sport and Marine, 2014 ND 12, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d 774, 778
(“Generally, this Court’s cases have examined force majeure, also called ‘acts of God,’ in the
context of liability for negligence and liability in cases where no clause was present in a contract.
However, in this case, the force majeure clause was specifically written into the contract.”).
226. Force-Majeure Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a forcemajeure clause as “[a] contractual provision allocating the risk of loss if performance becomes
impossible or impracticable, esp[ecially] as a result of an event or effect that the parties could not
have anticipated or controlled”).
227. Entzel, ¶ 2, 841 N.W.2d at 776-77.
228. Id. ¶ 3, 841 N.W.2d at 777. Paragraph 10 of the agreement provided: “The
LANDLORD will not be responsible for delays in hauling, launching, winter lay-up or
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the beginning of the leasing period.229 Due to the threat of a flood, the city
of Mandan instructed Moritz to take precautionary action concerning the
boats stored there.230 As a result, on May 26, Moritz notified Entzel that
owners had to remove their boats from the slips due to imminent
flooding.231 Moritz failed to tell Entzel when her boat could be returned to
the marina, and Entzel did not use the slip during the lease term.232 Other
Moritz customers, however, used their slips from mid-June through the end
of the season.233 Entzel sued Moritz in small claims court alleging breach
of contract and sought to recover the slip rental fee.”234 Moritz removed the
action to district court and defended that the force majeure clause in the
contract relieved it from liability.235
The Supreme Court held that the force majeure clause in the contract
relieved Moritz of liability and allocated the risk of loss to Entzel.236 The
clause, by its plain language, applied to delays in use of the slip that were
beyond the control of the Moritz, namely the imminent flood.237
The Supreme Court’s first foray into interpreting force majeure clauses
is rather straightforward. It does not offer much guidance for attorneys who
draft or litigate the clauses beyond two well-known principles: (1) the
specific language of the clause is most important; and (2) the party asserting
a force majeure clause to excuse performance may have to prove that the
triggering event was beyond its control.238
Counsel in North Dakota should be aware of some general
considerations relevant to drafting an effective force majeure clause. First,
in the absence of a negotiated force majeure clause, contracting parties are
left to invoke common law doctrines of impracticability and frustration of
purpose, which rarely excuse performance. Accordingly, parties may deem
it prudent to employ a force majeure clause as a tool to allocate the risk of
nonperformance in certain defined circumstances.

commissioning, occasioned by inclement weather or any other circumstances beyond its control.”
Id.
229. Id. ¶ 2.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Entzel, ¶ 2, 841 N.W.2d at 777.
233. Id.
234. Id. ¶ 3.
235. Id.
236. Id. ¶ 11, 841 N.W.2d at 779.
237. Id. ¶ 10.
238. Entzel, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d at 778 (explaining “[w]hat types of events constitute force
majeure depend on the specific language included in the clause itself”).
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Having decided to include a force majeure clause, parties must
determine the types of events and circumstances it will cover. Parties have
the freedom to define the events that will trigger the clause.239 The typical
clause encompasses natural disasters like hurricanes, floods, earthquakes,
and weather disturbances sometimes referred to as “acts of God.”240 Courts
tend to interpret force majeure clauses narrowly—only the enumerated
events, or sufficiently similar events, will be covered.241
Counsel should also recognize the need for careful drafting of the
language that comes before and after the list of covered events. For
example, courts have recognized limits to the use of a catch-all provision in
these clauses, such as “causes beyond the parties’ control.”242 Courts
generally construe such broad language as limited to unforeseeable rather
than foreseeable events.243
In Entzel, however, the Supreme Court potentially departed from this
majority approach when it noted that “[n]ot every force majeure event need
be beyond the parties’ reasonable control to still qualify as an excuse” for
nonperformance even though this force majeure clause contained express
language to the contrary.244 This dicta creates some ambiguity for
transacting parties, counsel, and courts because it suggests that North
Dakota courts embrace a broader view of the types of events that will
excuse nonperformance based on the force majeure clause.
Additionally, the language that follows the list of triggering events can
alter the scope of the force majeure clause. For example, where parties add
the words “or any other emergency beyond the parties’ control” to the end
of a list of triggering events, they unintentionally may narrow the clause to
events that, in a court’s view, qualify as emergencies.245

239. See id.
240. See Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 31 N.E.3d 80, 81-82 (N.Y. 2015)
(“Generally, a force majeure event is an event beyond the control of the parties that prevents
performance under a contract and may excuse nonperformance.”).
241. See, e.g., In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F.Supp.2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2012);
see also 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed. 2014).
242. See, e.g., Clean Uniform Co. St. Louis v. Magic Touch Cleaning, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 602,
608, 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
243. Id. at 610.
244. Entzel, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d at 778.
245. See, e.g., Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App. 1998). The
disputed force majeure clause in this oil and gas lease litigation contained a list of triggering
events followed by the catch-all phrase, “any cause whatsoever beyond the control of the Lessee.”
Id. at 280. The court held that because the catch-all phrase followed the list of triggering events, it
qualified each of those events with the result that an event could be a force majeure one for
purposes of the lease only if it was “outside of [a party’s] “reasonable control.” Id. at 288.
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Finally, as with any contractual provision, counsel should examine and
assess whether the specific type of transaction demands certain language to
protect one or both of the contracting parties. For example, there is some
evidence that force majeure clauses are increasingly important in oil and
gas leases.246 In at least one case, a mineral lessee unsuccessfully invoked a
force majeure clause as a result of government regulation in an attempt to
extend its lease term.247 Counsel to mineral lessors and lessees should
examine and assess whether the nature of the transaction presents special
drafting considerations for force majeure provisions, such as expressly
negating its applicability to acts of government regulation that might
interfere with leasing rights.
D.

PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION & PUGH CLAUSES

There has also been an increase in actions seeking to enforce the
validity of oil and gas leases. In North Dakota, the rules governing
interpretation of contracts apply to oil and gas leases.248 Accordingly, all
contracts are interpreted to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the
time of contracting.249 Two recent cases invited courts to construe Pugh
clauses in oil and gas leases using ordinary principles of contract
interpretation.250
A Pugh clause is a term in an oil and gas lease that severs the lease as
to areas of the subject property that do not contain a producing unit after the
initial term of the lease has expired.251 It is designed to protect a lessor
from having all of her lands held captive by the lease based on production
from a small portion of the property.252 “North Dakota law generally

246. See Joshua A. Swanson, The Hand of God: Limiting the Impact of the Force Majeure
Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 89 N.D. L. REV. 225, 225 (2013) (“This Article focuses on the
growing importance of the force majeure clause in oil and gas leases and discusses what mineral
owners can do to protect themselves against the unintended consequences of allowing the force
majeure clause to turn every event into an ‘Act of God’ that extends their lease indefinitely
without production or drilling operations.”). See also Jay D. Kelley, So What’s Your Excuse? An
Analysis of Force Majeure Claims, 2 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 91 (2007).
247. See Aukema v Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210-11 (N.D.N.Y.
2012) (holding that executive action suspending fracking, pending the completion of
environmental impact assessments, did not qualify as a force majeure event under the leases).
248. Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, ¶ 9, 848 N.W.2d 691, 695 reh’g
denied (Jul. 17, 2014); Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d 861, 864.
249. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9–07–03 (2015).
250. See Tank, ¶¶ 6-7, 848 N.W.2d at 694-95; N. Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Moen, 808 F.3d 373,
377 (8th Cir. 2015).
251. Moen, 808 F.3d at 377 (citing Tank, ¶ 14, 848 N.W.2d at 697).
252. Id. at 375 (citing Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 961 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.
1992)).
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presumes that oil and gas leases are indivisible,” meaning that production
on any part of the leased lands will maintain the lease beyond its initial term
for all land covered by the lease.253 A Pugh clause must “clearly and
explicitly” divide the land in order to defeat this presumption.254
In Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Moen, the parties disputed the
continued validity of an oil and gas lease based on conflicting
interpretations of the Pugh clause.255 The lease provided for an initial term
of five years and extended beyond that term as long as the lessee was
operating on the land.256 However, the lease also contained a Pugh
clause.257 That clause terminated the lease at the end of the initial term as
to all land except for land located “within the same section of a production
unit or spacing unit” on which there was “a well producing or capable of
producing” commercial quantities of oil or gas.258 The disputed issue was
whether the language in the Pugh clause of the contract severed the lease at
section boundaries or spacing unit boundaries.259 The Moens claimed that
the Pugh clause divided the lease at spacing-unit boundaries, while
Northern Oil claimed that the Pugh clause divided the lease at section
boundaries.260
The Eighth Circuit applied ordinary principles of contract interpretation
and held that the Pugh clause divided the lease at section boundaries rather
than spacing boundaries.261 The court invoked the canon that requires that
words in a contract be construed according to their “ordinary and popular”
meaning, unless the parties defined the words according to their technical
meaning.262 Looking to the ordinary meaning of the term “section” as it is
defined in the real estate context in Black’s Law Dictionary and in Williams
& Meyers Oil and Gas Law Manual of Terms—a one-square-mile tract of
land (640 acres)—as well as the parties use of the term “section” in other
parts of the lease to refer to Public Land System Survey (PLSS) sections,

253. Id. at 376 (citing Tank, ¶ 12, 848 N.W.2d at 696).
254. Id. at 377 (quoting Egeland, ¶ 17, 616 N.W.2d at 867).
255. Id. at 374-75.
256. Id. at 375.
257. Moen, 808 F.3d at 375.
258. Id. at 375-76.
259. Id. at 376.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 376-77 (citing Grynberg v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 599 N.W.2d 261, 265 (N.D.
1999)) (“North Dakota courts construe words in their ordinary and popular sense unless the parties
use them in a technical sense.”); see also Grynberg, 599 N.W.2d at 265 (explaining that “[a]
contract must be construed as a whole to give effect to each provision, if reasonably possible”).
262. Moen, 808 F.3d at 376.
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the court concluded that the parties intended to divide the lease at section
boundaries.263 The result is that the lease remained valid as to the disputed
area because production from other areas in the same section maintained the
lease as to the entire section.264
The North Dakota Supreme Court entertained the interpretation of a
Pugh clause in Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corporation about a year
earlier.265 The lease at issue in Tank contained a continuous drilling
operations clause that conflicted with a Pugh clause.266 The drilling clause,
if construed broadly, would have rendered the Pugh clause inoperative.267
The Supreme Court interpreted the lease to give effect to both clauses,
relying primarily on two rules of contract interpretation.268 First, it applied
the general principle that words in a contract—including an oil and gas
lease—must be construed according to their “ordinary and popular”
meaning, unless the parties defined the words according to their technical
meaning.269 It also applied the rule that a contract must be interpreted as a
whole and in a manner that gives effect to every provision, if possible.270
Applying these contract interpretation principles, the Supreme Court upheld
the Pugh clause in Tank in favor of the landowners.271
These decisions have implications for drafting oil and gas leases in
North Dakota, some of which are outside the scope of this Article and
require subject matter expertise beyond general contracting principles.272
That said, it is worth noting counsel should be mindful that these rulings
call attention to foundational drafting principles that are relevant to any
transaction. It is important with any draft written agreement to anticipate
all the ways the transaction might unfold and contemplate how that
sequence of events will play out under the provisions as written. Such an
exercise will demonstrate for counsel and their clients how the various
provisions of the contract interact with one another.

263. Id. at 377-78.
264. Id. at 379-80.
265. Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas, Corp., 2014 ND 123, 848 N.W.2d 691. For a lengthier
discussion of this case, see Jesse Liebe, Case Comment, Contracts — Mines and Minerals: North
Dakota Rejects Extension of Oil Production Contracts on Unused Land: Tank v. Citation Oil &
Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, 848 N.W.2d 691, 90 N.D. L. REV. 427 (2014).
266. Tank, ¶ 27, 848 N.W.2d at 699-700.
267. Id. ¶ 28.
268. Id.
269. Id. ¶ 41, 858 N.W.2d at 702 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
270. Id. ¶¶ 17, 28, 858 N.W.2d at 696, 700; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-06 (2015).
271. Tank, ¶ 25, 858 N.W.2d at 699.
272. See Liebe, supra note 265.
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E. RIGHT OF FIRST OFFER V. RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL
In Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Company, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that a clause in the contract was a right
of first offer, rather than a right of first refusal, despite conflicting language
in the contract.273 The contract included a purported right of first refusal, as
it was titled.274 It also included a handwritten sentence above the printed
“First Right of Refusal” clause, providing for a fixed-price option to
purchase.275 That clause provided: “This has changed to a three-year
purchase option to run concurrently.”276 Constellation tried to exercise the
option to purchase, but ultimately failed to furnish the required
consideration.277
The parties disagreed about whether the contract provided for an option
to purchase or a right of first refusal.278 The Supreme Court declined to
decide whether the addition of the handwritten option created an ambiguity,
because the right of first refusal (“ROFR”), though titled as such, was
actually a right of first offer (“ROFO”).279 Looking to the substance of the
clause rather than the title or label attached to it, the Supreme Court
concluded that the text of the clause more closely resembled a right of first
offer because it spoke in terms of the seller’s decision to sell, and it did not
require Western to inform Constellation of any third-party offers for the
property before it could sell to a third party, which is a feature consistent
with a right of first refusal.280 Further, Western’s notice triggered the right
of first offer, but Constellation did nothing to accept the offer.281
A right of first offer requires an owner to give the holder the first
opportunity to buy the subject property after the owner decides to sell it.282
A right of first refusal grants the holder the right to match the terms of any

273. Constellation Dev., LLC v. W. Tr. Co., 2016 ND 141, ¶ 15, 882 N.W.2d 238, 243.
274. Id. ¶ 2, 882 N.W.2d at 240 (The contract provided: “FIRST RIGHT OF REFUSAL: The
Seller will grant and give to the Buyer the First Right of Refusal for 5 years on the additional 62
acres as shown on Exhibit “B” attached to this Agreement should the Seller decide to sell any
more land. The purchase price in reference to the additional land will be at $18,000.00 per acre if
the Seller decides to sell additional land. If Seller decides to sell more land the Buyer will have 14
days to enter into a Purchase Agreement and 30 days to close the transaction or he will lose his
First Right of Refusal.”).
275. Id. ¶ 10, 882 N.W.2d at 242.
276. Id.
277. Id. ¶ 9, 882 N.W.2d at 241-42.
278. Id. ¶ 10, 882 N.W.2d at 242.
279. Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶ 10, 882 N.W.2d at 242.
280. Id. ¶ 15, 882 N.W.2d at 244.
281. Id.
282. Id. ¶ 14, 882 N.W.2d at 243.
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third party offers the owner has received on the subject property and then
purchase the property or pass on the deal.283 The main difference between a
right of first refusal and a right of first offer is the triggering event. A right
of first refusal is triggered when the owner receives an offer from a third
party and decides to sell. In contrast, a right of first offer is triggered when
the owner decides to offer the property for sale, period, without first
receiving an offer from a third party.284 The provision here, though titled a
right of first refusal, made no mention of a sale to a third party.285
This decision highlights for counsel the imperative of identifying a
client’s business objectives in connection with a transaction and then
translating those objectives into carefully drafted provisions.286 For
example, counsel for property owners should be aware that ROFRs raise a
concern that third parties may be less inclined to consider a purchase
because the holder of the ROFR can exercise its right to buy the property
under terms the third party assembled.
Counsel for holders, on the other hand, should note that a ROFO puts a
greater burden on the holder to carefully consider when and how to draft the
offer terms. A ROFO does not know how the owner values the property.
Accordingly, the holder and its counsel have to decide whether to have the
owner set price and other terms in advance, at the time of the granting of the
right, or later when the holder exercises the right. Typically, the
transactional documents will provide that the owner shall provide a notice
to the holder of its decision to sell. That notice triggers the ROFO and
specifies the price and terms the owner is willing to accept. This eliminates
the risk for the holder that its offer will undervalue the property.
Some foundational drafting considerations include the following: (1)
identify what triggers the right, and consider identifying what does not
trigger the right; (2) accurately describe the property (or asset) that is the
subject of the right; (3) state the price and other essential terms, or
alternatively, indicate that the owner’s notice will provide such terms; and
(4) stipulate what constitutes acceptance of the notice, including how long
the holder has to accept and the consequences of a failure to respond.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Constellation Dev., LLC, ¶¶ 13-15, 882 N.W.2d at 243-44.
286. Arguably, there is ambiguity concerning what the parties’ intended—a right of first
offer or a right of first refusal. The ruling does not indicate whether the parties had any extrinsic
evidence to proffer which would have revealed the parties’ actual intent. Further, the Supreme
Court’s decision appears to foreclose consideration of any extrinsic evidence on this point, when it
concludes that the substance of the provision is clearly a right of first offer despite the titling of
the provision as a right of first refusal.
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Counsel for all parties should also keep in mind that common law contract
doctrines may apply in the absence of the parties’ agreement as to specific
issues. There are many other considerations concerning the drafting of
rights of first refusal and first offer, but these are merely the most basic
ones.
VI. DEFENSES OF FORMATION OR ENFORCEMENT
A party to contract litigation may assert any number of doctrines as an
affirmative defense to avoid enforcement of an otherwise valid contract.
Noteworthy decisions from the survey period involve failure of
consideration, statute of frauds, and fraud.
A. FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION
Recent case law has addressed the failure of consideration as opposed
to the lack of sufficient or adequate consideration. Failure of consideration
is an affirmative defense to enforcement of an otherwise valid contract,
typically asserted where the other party has failed to perform its side of the
bargain.287 When asserted successfully, rescission is ordinarily the
remedy.288
In North Dakota, substantial performance constitutes sufficient
consideration.289 In Pegg v. Kohn, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that a party’s assertion of failure of consideration to avoid enforcement
must fail where the other party substantially performed his contractual
obligations.290 Pegg, an electrician, was dissatisfied with his job because
the company refused to pay him a percentage of revenue from one of his
significant clients.291 Pegg proposed a partnership with Kohn in Kohn’s
company, with Pegg contributing his client account and the attendant
revenue, as well as $10,000 of capital.292 Under the partnership, Pegg
would receive an hourly rage, ten percent of the partnership’s net revenue,
and ten percent of the gross revenue generated by his client’s business.293
No written agreement existed, but Pegg began working and contributed
significantly to the business including paying about $9000 for a truck titled

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Brash v. Gulleson, 2013 ND 156, ¶ 13, 835 N.W.2d 798, 802–03.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-02 (2015).
Pegg v. Kohn, 2015 ND 79, 861 N.W.2d 764.
Id. ¶ 12, 861 N.W.2d at 767.
Id. ¶ 3, 861 N.W.2d at 765.
Id.
Id.
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in the partnership’s name plus the costs of tools and equipment.294 Later,
Kohn denied existence of the partnership, so Pegg sued for breach of the
oral partnership agreement.295
Kohn argued a failure of consideration because Pegg did not pay the
entire $10,000 due under the oral agreement.296 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the longstanding rule that a party’s substantial performance
constitutes sufficient consideration to make the contract binding and permit
that party to recover for breach of contract.297
In contrast, in Brash v. Gulleson, the defendant successfully asserted
failure of consideration to avoid enforcement of a contract.298 In that case,
the parties entered into a lease agreement which directed Brash to provide
130 cows to Gulleson’s farm as well as replacement cows to maintain the
herd at that number.299 The record amply demonstrated that Brash failed to
furnish or maintain 130 cows during subsequent years, despite the
contractual language to the contrary.300 Gulleson raised failure of
consideration to avoid enforcement of the contract.301 The district court
concluded, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that there was a failure of
consideration, which rendered the contract unenforceable.302
These two cases illustrate the extreme ends of the spectrum with regard
to furnishing consideration: substantial—indeed ninety percent—
performance in Pegg contrasts with the Brash plaintiffs’ near total failure of
consideration.
These cases reiterate longstanding law in the state
concerning substantial performance and failure of consideration while
offering some benchmark standards for counsel to use in a litigation
posture. First, Brash reaffirms that failure of consideration means “the
failure to perform a substantial part of its obligation.”303 A less clear

294. Id.
295. Pegg, 2015 ND 79, ¶ 3, 861 N.W.2d at 765. The parties did not raise any statute of
frauds issue. Id.
296. Id. ¶ 11, 861 N.W.2d at 767.
297. Id. ¶ 12; see also Curtis Constr. Co., Inc. v. American Steel Span, Inc., 2005 ND 218, ¶
19, 707 N.W.2d 68, 74; Bismarck Realty Co. v. Folden, 354 N.W.2d 636, 641 (N.D. 1984);
Kruger v. Soreide, 246 N.W.2d 764, 773 (N.D. 1976); United States v. Dura–Lux Int’l Corp., 529
F.2d 659, 662–63 (8th Cir. 1976) (explaining that if “substantial performance was rendered . . . the
defense of failure of consideration cannot succeed”).
298. Brash v. Gulleson, 2013 ND 156, ¶ 25, 835 N.W.2d 798, 806.
299. Id. ¶ 15, 835 N.W.2d at 798.
300. Id. ¶ 24, 835 N.W.2d at 805-06.
301. Id. ¶ 25, 835 N.W.2d at 806.
302. Id.
303. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 20, 794 N.W.2d 715, 720.
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standard governs substantial performance:304 a “good faith attempt to
perform” constitutes substantial performance as long as the “essential
purpose” of the contract is achieved, even where the performance is not
exactly according to the agreement’s terms.305
B.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Like failure of consideration, a party may assert failure to comply with
the statute of frauds to avoid enforcement of an otherwise valid contract.
During the survey period, the North Dakota Supreme Court heard and ruled
on a handful of disputes that involved the statute of frauds and how it
interacts with promissory estoppel doctrine.306 Arguably, the more
interesting statute of frauds case is Trosen v. Trosen, described below,
where the Supreme Court did not invoke sua sponte a rule which would
have permitted the contract to satisfy the statute of frauds.
In Trosen v. Trosen, Shirley Trosen owned farmland and leased tracts
separately to her sons, Jeff and Brent.307 She entered into a three-year
written lease agreement with Jeff on January 1, 2011.308 The agreement,
however, failed to specify the amount of rent, i.e., the consideration.309 The
week that the parties signed the lease, Jeff also tendered to Shirley a check
dated “Jan. 2011” for $28,522 with “2011 farm land” indicated in the memo
line.310 Shirley did not cash the check and eventually returned it.311 Shirley
then allowed her other son, Brent, to farm the land.312 As a consequence,
Jeff sued for breach of contract and damages, as well as equitable relief.313
In North Dakota, a sufficient memorandum for purposes of satisfying
the statute of frauds must state the parties’ identity, the agreement’s subject
matter, and the consideration, and it must be signed by the party attempting
to escape enforcement of the contract.314 The Supreme Court concluded

304. “There is no fixed formula by which [substantial performance] can be determined
because the word ‘substantial’, the meat of the doctrine, in this context, is a relative term.” Pegg
v. Kohn, 2015 ND 79, ¶ 12, 861 N.W.2d 764, 767 (quoting Dittmer v. Nokleberg, 219 N.W.2d
201, 208 (N.D.1974)).
305. Pegg ¶ 12, 861 N.W.2d at 767 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
306. See supra Section III.B.
307. Trosen v. Trosen, 2014 ND 7, ¶ 2, 841 N.W.2d 687, 690.
308. Id. ¶ 4.
309. Id. ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d at 692.
310. Id. ¶ 3, 841 N.W.2d at 690.
311. Id. ¶ 6, 841 N.W.2d at 691.
312. Id.
313. Trosen, ¶¶ 6-7, 841 N.W.2d at 691.
314. Id. ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d at 692.
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that this lease agreement was clearly within the statute of frauds but was
invalid because it failed to comply with the legal requirements for a
sufficient memorandum.315 It failed because the written lease did not state
the consideration—the rent.316
The Supreme Court does not appear to address longstanding doctrine
that permits a party to combine writings to satisfy the statute of frauds
memorandum requirement.317 A memorandum need not be a single
document in order to satisfy the statute of frauds.318 Rather, an agreement
may satisfy the statute of frauds through a combination of separate writings
“as long as they refer to each other and to the same persons and things, and
manifestly relate to the same contract and transaction.”319 North Dakota
decisional law embraces this approach:
[The] memorandum need not be a complete contract in itself, but
may consist of several documents, letters or telegrams, provided
these documents show who are the contracting parties,
intelligently identify the subject matter involved, express the
consideration and disclose the terms and conditions upon which
the contract is entered into.320
The Supreme Court’s decision is silent as to the ability of a party to
combine writings to satisfy the statute of frauds. Arguably, the written
lease combined with the check satisfies the memorandum requirements.
The written lease fails to state the rent, but the check does indicate the rent,
the parties’ identities, and refers to the lease in a notation on the check’s
memo line.321 Accordingly, as long as Shirley has signed the written lease,
she should not be able to escape enforcement of it based on a statute of
frauds defense.322 Perhaps counsel failed to raise this issue, or perhaps
there is some other reason combining the documents would be infeasible
here. Regardless, the decision provides counsel an opportunity to review
the myriad ways to satisfy the statute of frauds memorandum requirements
for litigation and client counseling purposes.

315. Id. ¶ 15, 841 N.W.2d at 693.
316. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 841 N.W.2d at 692.
317. See id.
318. Johnson v. Auran, 214 N.W.2d 641, 650 (N.D. 1974).
319. Thomas J. Baird Inv. Co. v. Harris, 209 F. 291, 295 (8th Cir. 1913).
320. Id. (quoting Hoth v. Kahler, 74 N.W.2d 440, 441 (N.D. 1956)); see also Hoth, 74
N.W.2d at 447 (quoting Goetz v. Hubbell, 266 N.W. 836, 838 (1936)) (explaining that “[a]ny kind
of document or documents, taken singly or together, may constitute the required memorandum”).
321. Trosen v. Trosen, 2014 ND 7, ¶ 4, 841 N.W.2d 687, 690.
322. See Thomas J. Baird Inv. Co., 209 F. at 295.
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C. FRAUD
Fraud is another defense to enforcement of a contract that was before
the North Dakota Supreme Court during the survey period. In two different
cases, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to distinguish the types of
statements that constitute actual fraud from statements of opinion, which do
not constitute fraud.
In both cases, the Supreme Court’s starting point was a North Dakota
statute that defines actual fraud as affirmatively stating a fact, known to be
untrue, with intent to induce another to enter into a contract.323 Fraud also
includes making factual statements that the party does not believe to be
true, suppressing material facts known or believed to be true, and making a
promise without any intention of performing it.324 Statements of opinion,
or statements which amount to mere puffery or sales talk, do not constitute
fraud.325
In Ganske, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district
court, which had concluded that alleged misrepresentations were mere sales
talk, puffery, or opinion and were not material to the lessors fraudulent
inducement claims.326 In this case, the lessee asserted numerous facts about
its company’s success in past drilling operations as well as its readiness to
drill on the lessors’ property.327 The Supreme Court held that the alleged
misrepresentations in Ganske were well beyond mere puffery, sales talk, or
statements of opinion in that the statements asserted specific, concrete facts
which Golden Eye knew to be untrue and allegedly made to induce the
lessors to enter into the disputed leases.328 In contrast, in Ward Farms
Partnership v. Enerbase Cooperative Resources, the alleged fraud involved
statements that a tractor for sale was “field ready” or “in good shape.”329
The Supreme Court held that such statements were sales talk or puffery that
did not rise to the level of fraud.330
The juxtaposition of these two cases highlights the need to train field
representatives about the outer limits of sales talk so that a business can
protect itself against fraud actions.
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VII. CONCLUSION
There was an array of cases involving North Dakota contract law
during the survey period from which one can extrapolate at least three
themes concerning contracts law in North Dakota. First, courts applying
North Dakota contract law continue to embrace, rather than depart from,
longstanding contract doctrine. The number of instances in which the court
reaffirms existing principles of contract law suggests that there are no
watershed departures from existing norms on the horizon. Second, courts
applying North Dakota contract law look for practical, common sense
approaches to interpreting clauses in ways that reflect contracting behavior
and preserve the enforceability of the contract. Lastly, there is a
foreshadowing perhaps of issues to watch, particularly with respect to
estoppel claims, preemptive rights—such as rights of first refusal and first
offer—and interpretation issues arising under oil and gas leases and in
construction contracts.

